Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)

1968

E.J. Garn v. Salt Lake City Corporation, A
Municipal Corporation of The State of Utah, and
Union Street Railway Corporation, a Corporation
of The State of Massachusetts : Memorandum In
Response To Order To Show Cause and In
Support of Defendants' Motion To Dismiss
Petition For Writ of Prohibition

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.Leon A. Halgren and Joseph J. Palmer; Attorneys for Defendant
Recommended Citation
Legal Brief, Garn v. Salt Lake City, No. 11333 (1968).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/3466

This Legal Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH

GARN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

vs.
CITY CORPORAION, a municipal corporaion of the State of Utah,
nd UNION STREET RAILWAY
ORPORATION, a corporation
f the State of MassachuDefendants- Respondents.

)

Case No. 11333

)

)

)

MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO ORDER
TO SHOW CAUSE AND IN SUPPORT OP
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS
PETITION FOR WRIT OF PROHIBITION

WORSLEY, SNOW & CHRIST:as ..
701 Continental Bank alctlJ.
Salt Lake City, Otah
Attorneys for defendant
Union Street Railway corp.
South Third East

lt Lake City, Utah

torney for plaintiff
J. Garn

LEON A. HALGREN
Asst. Salt Lake City
Attorney
409 City and County Bld9.
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for defendant
salt Lake City Corporation

1

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF THE CASE
STATEMENT OF FACTS •

•

•

•

ARGUMENT.

2
2
9

POINT I.
THE CITY HAS THE POWER TO MAKE
PAYMENTS UNDER THE CONTRACT EVEN
THOUGH THE CITY DOES NOT PRESENTLY
OWN THE BUS LINE • • • • • • • • • •

10

POINT II.
THE CITY IS NOT LENDING ITS
CREDIT TO OR SUBSIDIZING A PRIVATE
CORPORATION CONTRARY TO ARTICLE VII,
SECTION 31 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION.

28

POINT III.
THE CITY HAS POWER TO PERFORM THE AGREEMENT EVEN THOUGH IT
ALSO PROVIDES FOR BUS SERVICE OUTS IDE SALT LAKE CITY.

34

CONCLUSION.

41

•

•

•

•

CASES CITED

Admiral Realty Co. v. City of New York
(N.Y. 1920) 99 NE 241. • .
• ..•
Bailey v. van Dyke, 66 Utah 184, 240 P.
4 54.

•

• •

• • • • • • • • • • • •

25
30

Bair v. Layton City Corporation, 6 Utah
2d 138, 307 P.2d 895 (1957) 18, 19, 21,

30

Bohn v. salt Lake City, 79 Utah 121, 8
P.2d 591 (1932). . . . . . . . . . • .

14

i

Borough of East Rutherford v. Sterling
Paper Converting Co. (N.J.) 32 A. 2d
855. . . . . . . . . • • .

14

City of Mill Valley v. Saxton (Cal. 1940)
106 P.2d 455 . • . . .
• .24, 36
Cincinnati v. Harth (Ohio 1920) 128 N.E.
263, 13 ALR 309 and Anno. at 313 . • 32, 34
Kennecott Copper Corporation v. State Tax
corrunission (D.C. Utah 1944), 60 F.Supp.
181. . • . . . . • . . . • . .
34
Muir v. Murray City, 55 Utah 368, 186 P.
433. • . . . . . . .
.25, 35, 38
Provo City v. Department of Business Regulation, 118 Utah 1, 218 P.2d 675 (1950) 35
Lawrence v. O'Connell (D.C.R.I.) 141 F.
Supp. 316, Affd. 1st Cir., 238 F. 2d
4 76. . . . . • . . . • . . . • . • . •

13

Rich v. Salt Lake City Corporation, 20
Utah 2d 339, 437 P. 2d 690 (February
20, 1968) . . . . . 3, 4, 5, 13, 18, 22, 29
State Road Corrunission of Utah v. Utah
Power & Light co., 10 Utah 2d 333, 353
P.2d 171 . . . . .
. • . .

29

Utah Rapid Transit co. v. Ogden City,
89 Utah 2d 546, 58 P.2d 1. .

22

Utah State Land Board v. Utah State
Finance Corrunission, 12 Utah 2d 265,
365 P. 2d 213 . . . • . . • . . . . .

30

ii

v. Santa Quin City, 83 Utah 321
28 P.2d 161. . • . .
• • . 22, 23,

~dsworth

24

1Visconsin Power & Light Company v. Public
Service Commission (Wisc. 1939) 286, N.W.
5 88
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
38

AUTHORITIES CITED
73

c JS

ANNO.

I

I

p.

12 5 5 •

•

•

•

11 ALR 2d 168.

Dillon, Municipal Corp.
Laws of Utah,
Anno.,

14

14
.

14

1955, Chap 26, Sec. 2 •

20

98 ALR 1001

37

STATUTES CITED
Constitution of Utah
Article VII, Sec 31.
Article XI, Sec 5(5)
:utah Code Annotated, 1953
10-8-14.
• •••
10-7-1 • •
10-8-2 •
10-7-20 • • • • • • • •
10-8-61. . • . • • . • • •
10-8-38.
17-2-22 • .
17-6-3.8{c).

ii. i.

28,

29
21
4
12
12
15
19
20
20
20

IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STA'IE OF UTAH

L J. GARN,

Plaintiff,

vs.
SALT LAKE CITY COR-

PORATION, a municipal
corpora ti on of the
s~te of Utah, and
UNION STREET RAILWAY
CORPORATION, a corpo.cation of the state of
Massachusetts,

Case No. 11333

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO ORDER TO SHOW
CAUSE AND IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION
TO DISMISS PETITION FOR WRIT OF PROHIBITION

Defendants submit this Memorandum in response
:o the Court's Order to Show Cause dated July 22,
968,

as their showing why plaintiff's Petition

or Writ of Prohibition herein should be denied
nd in support of their Motion to Dismiss the
~ti ti on

for writ of Prohibition upon the grounds

2

that the Petition fails to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted.
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an original proceeding instituted
in this Court by plaintiff, a taxpayer of Salt
Lake City, praying for a Writ to prevent defendant
Salt Lake City Corporation from performing an
Agreement of July 18, 1968, between the defendant
City and the defendant Union Street Railway Corporation relating to bus transportation in Salt
Lake City.

Plaintiff alleges the City is without

legal authority or power to perform such agreement
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts are not in dispute.

They appear

from the =r:ecitals contained in the Agreement
between Salt Lake City Corporation and Union
Street Railway Company dated July 16, 1968, copy
of which is attached to the Pe ti ti on for Writ of
Prohibition.
The Agreement was made after this Court's

3

decision in Rich v. Salt Lake City Corporation,
20 Utah 2d 339, 437 P. 2d 690 (February 20,
1968).

In that case, as this, it appears Salt

Lake City Lines, Inc. for many years operated the
public bus transportation system in Salt Lake
1

City and metropolitan area.

City Lines indicated

that due to increasing deficits incurred by it,
it intended to discontinue its business and
wind up its operations.

The Board of Commissione1

of Salt Lake City resolved that the City, being
the only entity capable of operating a transportation system, would operate a bus transportation
system and that the City would enter into negotiations with Salt Lake City Lines, Inc. for the
purchase of its facilities and property.
Court,

in the Rich case, held the City,

This
under

the constitution and statutes of Utah, has the
, power to acquire and operate the bus transportation system as proposed by it, and particularly

4

under Section 10-8-14, U.C.A. 1953, which provides
"They {the cities) may construct,
maintain and operate water works, gas
works, electric light works, telephone
lines or street railways, or authorize
the construction, maintenance and operation of the same by others, or purchase
or lease such works from any person or
corporation, and they may sell and deliver the surplus product or service
of any such works, not required by the
city or its inhabitants, to others beyond
the limits of the City."
This court held the words "street railways" ineludes motor buses.
After the Rich decision, the situation for
City Lines became more critical, for its union
voted to strike unless its demands for wage increases were met, but continued to work only
upon assurances from the City that attempts would
be

made to increase wages.

City Lines, Inc.

maintained it could not grant a wage increase and
that it had no alternative other than to go out
of business and cease operating its bus line

system.

The Board of commissioners of the City

5

determined that loss of the bus system would
amount to a major catastrophe causing great loss
to the business community and great handicap and
inconvenience to its residents in moving about
the City and its environs.

Hence,

the Board

conducted extensive investigation and found no
prospect whatever of any private enterprise permanently taking over and operating the bus line
system.

As authorized by the Rich case, the

City negotiated with City Lines for the purchase
of its facilities and property.

City Lines

offered to either (1) sell the assets of the bus
line to the City for more than $500,000 or (2)
to lease the assets to the City for which City
Lines would manage the bus line for one year for
a certain consideration, provided the City would
obligate itself to purchase the equipment -at the
end of one year, and provided the City furnished
the labor for operating the bus line.

For the

City to furnish the labor meant not only negotiati

6
with the Union but also bringing the bus employees into the City's higher existing wage scale.
The City did not have the funds to meet City
Lines' purchase price and lacked the operating
experience in the bus business to know whether
it was even wise to presently obligate itself to
make such purchase in one year.

The City desired

further time to investigate the desirability of
making the purchase itself and to investigate

the possibilities .and practicalities of obtaining
financial grants or loans from the Federal Government under enabling federal legislation.

If

such federal plan appears desirable and practical,

the City may establish a transit authority with
the federal funds to purchase and operate the
bus line which may obviate the necessity of the
City even purchasing and operating the bus line
at all.

More than one year would be required for

the City to determine whether it should purchase
'the bus lines,

or should apply for federal funds,
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or should establish a mass transit authority to
purchase and operate it.
With the City in that situation,
appeared defendant Union Street.
!

then

Under the

Agreement now attacked, it agreed to purchase the
same assets from City Lines and to give the City
the four things the City immediately needed,
being:

{l) a bus line operating in and about

I

isalt Lake City for two years on fixed schedules

!

I at fixed rates so that service could be maintained
I
I

; (2) a two year option to purchase the bus line
!

assets and not a requirement that the city purchase them for $500,000 plus interest, less depreciation plus the value of any additions and
less the value of any deletions in bus line
assets during the two years;

(3)

management

assistance from experienced bus operators to
help the City to determine whether to ultimately
Purchase the bus line or whether to apply for
federal aid, and assistance in applying for federa

8

grants or loans if that appears desirable,
assistance in establishing a public transit
authority and full financial information to
give the city two years actual operating experience in bus operations, all designed to provide
a smooth transition into whatever new plan might
be worked out on the most prudent basis after
the two years without interruption of scheduled
bus service; and (4) most important, two years
time for the City to determine the best basis
, for working out a permanent, prudent solution to
the problem of insuring adequate bus transportation in the City without interruption of bus
service before or during the two year period.
In return,

the City agreed to pay Union Street

$6,200 per month for the first 12 months and
$11, 250 per month for the next 12 months, payable
at the end of each month of operation provided
Union street has not defaulted in the preceding
month.

The Board of Commissioners of the City

9

determined that such payment would be less
expensive than if, after purchasing or leasing

the bus line from City Lines, it contracted with
city Lines for management or managed it itself.
The Board of Commissioners expressly found that

the Agreement would enhance the general welfare
of

the inhabitants of the City and that the

payments provided would be in the public interest.
ARGUMENT
Plaintiff attacks the Agreement, saying

the City has no power to make such payments under
the Constitution and statutes of Utah for three
reasons:
1.

The City does not own the bus line,

contrary to Section 10-8-14, u.c.A. 1953.
2.

The City is lending its credit to

or subsidizing a private corporation,
contrary to Article VII, Section 31, Utah
Constitution.
3.

The City is benefiting and subsidizing

10
persons out of Salt Lake City by providing
them bus service contrary to 10-8-14,
A.

u.c.

1953.

Plaintiff, in effect, would have the City follow

the more expensive course.

Defendants submit

the City has the power to make such payments
under the Agreement and is not in violation of
law in so doing.
POINT I.

THE CITY HAS THE POWER TO MAKE

t1AYMENTS UNDER THE CONTRACT EVEN THOUGH THE CITY

DOES NOT PRESENTLY OWN THE BUS LINE.

Plaintiff in substance complains that City
has no proprietary interest in Union Street, has
only an option to purchase the bus assets, that

the money paid to Union Street over the two year
: period will not be credited to the option purchase
. price,

that the City has no control or interest

in the assets or actions of Union Street, in no

way participates in the operation of Union Street,
and 2sserts an option to purchase is not a lease

l

11
as permitted under 10-8-14,

u.c.A.

1953.

Consider first that Salt Lake City is not
paying just for bus service, as plaintiff asserts:
instead, it is also paying for and receiving
valuable management experience and expertise in
learing to operate a bus line to be used if the
City elects to purchase and operate it, to be
used in deciding whether to purchase and operate
it,

to be used in determining whether to apply

for federal funds and if such appears to be
desirable, to be used in applying for and obtaining the federal funds.

Further, the City is

i

paying for and receiving an option to purchase
the assets to insure that at the end of two
years those bus line assets still will be available,

not as disorganized pieces of equipment,

but as part of a going concern.
Plaintiff ignores the fact that the City
Will receive value through the management experience and the option to purchase for its monthly

::-
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payments.

These standing by themselves support

the City's power to enter into the agreement

and to make the payments, for under Section 107-1,

U.C.A. 1953, cities may "make contracts and

acquire and hold real and personal property for
corporate purposes" and Section 10-8-2, u. c.A.
1953 provides:

"They (the cities) may appropriate
money for corporate purposes only .•• ;
may purchase, receive, hold, sell, lease,
convey and dispose of property, real
and personal, for the benefit of the
City, both within and without its corporate boundaries, improve and protect
such property and may do all other
things in relation thereto as natural
persons ....
It shall be deemed a corporate purpose to appropriate money
for any purpose which in the judgment
of the Board of Commissioners or City
Council will provide for the safety,
preserve the health, promote the prosperity and improve the morals, peace,
order, comfort and convenience of the
inhabitants of the City."
The Board of Commissioners of Salt Lake City

expressly found that the Agreement will provide
for the general welfare of the inhabitants of
the City in the statutory language,

thereby

,_
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making such payment a proper appropriation for
corporate purposes within Section 10-8-2 and a
proper contract for corporate purposes within
section 10-7-1.

The wisdom and practicality of

the City so contracting for the management
experience and option to purchase is an undertaking solely for the people of the City through
their elected city government to determine and
is not a concern of the courts whose function is
to pass on questions of law.

See concurring

opinion of Chief Justice Crockett in Rich v.
Salt Lake City Corporation, supra.
There can be no question that City has the
power to purchase the option to purchase.

Under

Section 10-8-2, the City "may purchase and receive_
... property ... , and may do all things in relation
thereto as natural persons •.•. "
is property.
141 F. Supp.

The word

11

An option itself

Lawrence v. O'Connell (D.C.R.I.)
316, Affd. 1st Cir., 238 F. 2d 476.

purchase" means all lawful acquisitions

c

14
of property by any means whatever, except
descent.

73 CJS, p. 1255.

It is well settled

that power of a city to acquire property by purchase includes the lesser power to acquire propert
by lease.

Anno., 11 ALR 2d 168.

In Borough of

East Rutherford v. Sterling Paper Converting co.
(N.J.)

32 A. 2d 855, it was held where the city

has the power to lease property, it has the implied power to grant an option to lease as an
incident of the specifically granted power.

Bohn c

v. Salt Lake City, 79 Utah 121, 8 P.2d 591 (1932)
approved language from Dillon, Municipal Corporations,

that the grant of power to a city carries

' with it such power as is necessarily and fairly
implied or incident thereto; that implied and
incidental powers include those necessary to give
effect to the powers expressly granted; and that
the rule of strict construction of powers granted
municipal corporations does not apply to the mode
adopted by the municipality to carry into effect
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powers expressly or plainly granted where the
mode is not limited or prescribed by the legislature and is left to the discretion of municipal
authorities, and in such cases the usual test

of the validity of the act is whether it is
teasonable and there is no presumption against
the municipal action in such cases.
In light of such authorities,

there can be

no question that the city here has power to purchase an option to purchase.
section 10-7-20,

u.c.A.

1953, says:

"Nothing in this article shall be
construed to require bids to be called
for or contracts let for the conduct
or management of any of the departments,
business or property of such city •..• "
That section clearly grants City the power to
contract for management experience in operating
the bus lines,

first since the operation of a

bus line is a proper business of the City and

second, because it is contracting for the management of the property over which it holds an

16
option to purchase.
Now,

then,

taking plaintiff's position that

the City is paying only for bus service when it
does not own the property, we submit that the
City still has the power to make the payment.
Obviously,

under Section 10-8-2, the City

could have purchased the bus line and managed
it itself, or could have purchased it and leased
it to Union Street, or could have leased the
bus line from City Lines and under 10-8-2 and
10-7-20 could have hired Union Street to manage

it for a management fee.

However, here the Board

of Commissioners specifically found that it did
not have the funds to purchase the assets, and
whether it purchased or leased the assets, operating the bus line itself or hiring City Lines to
operate it would have been more expensive than
paying the payments provided under the Agreement
i

in issue.

That the City would have otherwise

incurred greater expense, even if it purchased
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the line for over $500,000, answers plaintiff's
argument that the money paid by the City over
the two year period will not be credited to the
purchase prive for the assets if the City exercise
the option.

That also answers plaintiff's argu-

ment that the City has no control over the actions
of Union Street and no proprietary interest in the
corporation,

for by the terms of the contract,

Union Street takes all of the risk of loss in
operating the bus line.

The Board of commissioner

of Salt Lake City expressly found it to be one
of the advantages in entering into the Agreement
that the City would not incur the risk of loss.
Finally,

the fact that the City has the option

to purchase the bus line assets, which certainly
is an equitable right, destroys the argument that
the City has no interest or control over the
assets.
It is true Section 10-8-14 provides only
that cities may "maintain and operate ..• street

3
!:
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railways (read "Bus Line", Rich v. Salt Lake
City, supra), or authorize the construction,
maintenance and operation of the same by others,

or purchase of lease such works from any person."
and does not expressly say the City may pay for
the operation of the bus line of another.

It is submitted, however, that since the
City has the option to purchase the bus line and
it is a proper business of the City,

the City

may contract for the management thereof pursuant

to Section 10-7-20, U.C.A. 1953.
Further,

there is ample authority to support

the proposition that the City does have the im-

' plied power to pay for the operation of a bus line:
by another,

even though the City does not own the

bus line.
In Bair v. Layton City Corporation, 6 Utah

2d 138, 307 P.2d 895 (1957) Layton City contracted
with North Davis County Sewer District to make
monthly payments to the sewer district for

19
operating expenses of the District's sewer
system in return for the District providing the
services of disposal and treatment of sewage.
Plaintiff taxpayers sought a writ to enjoin
payment upon the grounds, among others, that the
City had no constitutional or statutory power to
make the payments.

This Court held:

"The general powers conferred on
the city and its officers as governing
body clearly authorize the city to
enter into this kind of contract. See
Article 11, Section 5, Subdivision (5)
constitution of Utah; sections 10-7-1,
10-8-2, 10-8-61, 10-8-38, u.c.A. 1953
and Laws of Utah, 1955, Chapter 26,
Section 2."
The case here is stronger on its facts than in
~-

Layton City did not own the sewer district':

property, as here, but here Salt Lake City does
have an option to purchase the property.

Sections

i0-7-1 and 10-8-2 have been cited above; they
each were held sufficient in Bair to authorize
Layton City to make the payments objected to.
Section 10-8-61 is a general statute providing

20
cities may make regulations to secure the
general health of the city, etc.
Section 10-8-38 cited in Bair is important;
it provides cities "may construct,

reconstruct,

maintain and operate, sewer systems, sewage treatment plants, ... "

It does not provide cities may

pay another to maintain and operate sewage treatment plants which the City does not own; yet
this Court sustained Layton City's implied power
to do so under that section.

So here, though

Section 10-8-14 does not provide cities may pay
another to operate bus lines it does not own,
the Court should here sustain the city's power
to do so.
Laws of Utah,

1955, Chapter 26, Section 2,

cited in Bair, is now Section 17-6-22 of the
Utah Code Annotated 1953, and that Section and
Section 17-6-3.8(c) provide only that sewer
districts may contract with "municipal corporatior
for sewer services,but do not provide municipal
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corporations may pay for such service.
This Court's citation of Article XI, Section
5, subdivision (5), Constitution of Utah, in
Bair is significant.

Article XI provides:

"Each city forming its charter
under this section shall have, and is
hereby granted, the authority to exercise all powers relating to municipal
affairs, •.• and no enumeration of powers
in this constitution or any law shall
be deemed to limit or restrict the general authority hereby conferred; but
this grant of authority shall not ... be
deemed to limit or restrict the power of
the legislature in matters relating to
State Affairs to enact general laws
applicable to all cities of the State.
"The power to be conferred upon
the cities by this section shall include the following:

*****
" {b)
To furnish all local
public services, to purchase, hire,
construct, own, maintain or operate, or lease, public utilities,
local in extent and use;" (emphasis add
Does that article confer on Salt Lake City the
power to hire public utilities?
~air

Its citation in

v. Layton City corporation would seem to
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indicate it does, since Layton City is a legislative city, and not a charter city.

Rich v.

salt Lake City Corporation, supra, held:
"Salt Lake City being a legislative city as contrasted with a charter
city, we must look at the acts of the
legislature in determining what powers
may be exercised by the City."
Utah Rapid Transit Co. v. Ogden City, 89 Utah
2d 546,
Rich

58 P.2d 1, held to the same effect as

but was overruled by this Court in Rich on

other grounds.

Utah Rapid Transit co. relied

for authority upon Wadsworth v. Santa Quin City,
83 Utah 321,

28 P.2d 161.

There, this Court

said:
"The question there is, Are the
powers enumerated in the amendment
(Article XI) equally available to cities
operating under legislative enactment?
The answer we think must be in the
affirmative, at least to the extent
that the legislature has conferred any
such powers on the cities .•.. The
reservoir of power is the same, and
we can perceive of no reason to distin~
guish between the charter adopted by
the people of a city and one enacted by
general law of the Legislature based
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merely on the origin of the legislation .... We think the enumeration of
the power to borrow money on the security of a utility or its income, or
both, was intended by the people in
adopting the constitutional amendment
to place such power within the scope
of municipal action, and was clearly
intended to be available to chartered
cities informing their own charters, and
in addition thereto by use of the language, 'power to be conferred upon the
cities by this section,' just as clearly
was intended to enumerate a power which
the Legislature might, if it chose,
confer on cities depending on general
law for their organization and authority."
While the Wadsworth case held that all cities do
not have all the powers enumerated in the amendment because the amendment is not self-executing,
it did hold that all the powers enumerated in
the amendment are equally available to cities
operating under legislative enactment, "at least
to the extent that the Legislature has conferred
any such powers on the cities."

Here the Legis-

lature has conferred on cities the powers to
maintain and operate bus lines or to authorize
the maintenance and operation of the same by

24

Jthers under Section 10-8-14; the Legislature
has to that extent conferred

on the cities.

11

11

any such powers

Did the Leg is la tu re also intend

to confer on cities the power to hire public

utilities?

As in Wadsworth,

there is

11

no reason

to distinguish beb1een a charter adopted by the

people of a city and one enacted by the general

law of the Legislature.

Thus,

it would seem the

Legislature did impliedly confer on legislative
dties the power to hire public utilities.
City of Mill Valley v. Saxton (Cal. 1940)
106 P.2d 455 where the Court said:

Amicus curiae advance the point
that the constitutional section is not
self-executing and that hence the city is
without the power to act in the absence
of a legislative enabling act.
It is
then contended that, since certain
sections of the Municipal Corporations
Act fail to mention bus lines specifically, the city is without power to establish them. Both the premise and the
conclusion are erroneous. The Constitution expressly authorizes 'any' city
to establish and operate public works
for 'transportction'.
It expressly
authorizes such city to furnish 'such
11

25
services to inhabitants outside its
boundaries'. Here is the grant of
power.
If the legislature should
attempt by statutory enactment to deny
or with~old the power as to any special
class of cities its act would be clearly
unconstitutional.
If it attempted the
same result indirectly by failing to
mention the power in some corollary
legislation, its act to that extent
would have no effect on the constitutional grant."
{Emphasis added.)
Even if the City's power to. make the payrnents to Union Street is not found by implication
under Section 10-8-14, it is clearly available
under Section 10-8-2 and 10-7-1 as an appropriation of money for corporate purposes.

Muir v.

Murray City, 55 Utah 368, 186 P. 433, sustained
llie power of the city to establish an electric
light plant and transmission lines beyond its
boundaries under section 10-8-2 and said of the
section:
"{I) t is pertinent
perhaps no State in the
greater powe s upon its
porations than does the

to remark that
Union confers
municipal corState of Utah."

In point is Admiral Realty co. v. City of

26

New York (N.Y. 1920)

99 NE 241.

There New York

city owned and operated a subway system and a
private company owned and operated an adjoining
system in an adjoining town.

A contract was

made for the adjoining company to construct and
equip new subways both in and out of New York
at their joint expense and for joint operation
by the adjoining company of the entire new system,
including the new construction as well as the
systems formerly operated separately by the City
and the adjoining company.

The contract provided

that from the earnings of the entire consolidabed
unit, payment would be made first to the adjoining
company of its operating expense for the new
entire system,

next to the adjoining company

principal and interest on the money spent by it
for new construction and equipment,

next to the

adjoining company an annual sum equal to the
earnings of its present operations on its preconstruction system,

next, payment to New York
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city on account of its investment, and finally,
a division of the remainder equally between the

city and the adjoining company.

The New York

court found the City had the implied power to
perform the agreenent.

The Court relied upon

prior authority for the_ propositions that the
construction of subways by the City is a city
purpose and that the City need not itself operate
its own subway but might provide for its operation
by lease to someone else.

The Court sustained

the City's implied power under general statutory

provisions to perform the contract despite objeclions that the city was guaranteeing earnings to
the adjoining company of the latter's former

system and that the city was contributing money
to the private company to improve the private
company's own subway system.

The only difference

between the Admiral Realty case and the case at
1Jar is that New York City already owned the subway system in its own city which is not the case
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here; however,

the cases are identical as

respects the portion of the subway system owned
by the adjoining company outside of the City.

It is submitted that in light of the
foregoing,

plaintiff's contention that the City

has no power to perform the Agreement in issue
because the City does not own, but has only an
option to purchase,

the bus line is without

merit.
POINT II.

THE CITY IS NOT LENDING ITS

CREDIT TO OR SUBSIDIZING A PRIVATE CORPORATION
CON'Il'.RARY TO ARTICLE VII, SECTION 31 OF THE UTAH
CONSTITUTION.
Article VII, Section 31, of the Utah Constitution provides:
"The Legislature shall not authorize
... any .•. city ••• to lend its credit or
subscribe to stock or bonds in aid of
any railroad, telegraph or other private
individual or corporate enterprise or
undertaking."
It is clear that operating a bus line is a
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proper public service and municipal purpose.
Rich v. Salt Lake City Corporation; 10-8-14,

u.c.A. 1953.
In State Road Commission of Utah v. Utah
power & Light Co., 10 Utah 2d 333, 353 P.2d 171,
against the contention that the State could not
pay the Power Company for relocation of utility
poles under the Utility Relocation Act by virtue
of Article VII,

Section 31, of tre Constitution,

this Court said:

"Public welfare demands that the
public be served with water, sewer
systems, electricity, gas, telephone
and telegraph, as well as transportation and means of travel.
These
services are vital to the well-being
of our various communities.
It would
be almost impossible to meet these urgent
requirements without making use of
public property.
The presence of the
utility facilities on the streets constitute a use in the public interest ..•
"We said that Article VI, Section
31, of our constitution is not violated
even when direct gifts and loans of
state funds are made to people in need
under our public Welfare Program because
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of a public purpose served in discharging, not the legal, but the moral
obligation, of the State to care for
its poor .... "
In Bailey v. Van Dyke, 66 Utah 184, 240
P. 454,

it was claimed that the County's payment

for agricultural extension work in conducting
field studies and demonstrations on farms to
assist in stimulating better business methods
on the farms violated this article of the con-

stitution.

This Court held to the contrary,

saying:
"If the appropriation of county
funds authorized is for a public purpose,
the statute (under which the payment
is made) is clearly not prohibited by
the Constitution."
Bair v. Layton City Corporation, supra, held
the contract did not violate this Article of
the Constitution and it is identical on its
facts to this case.
In Utah State Land Board v. Utah State
Finance Commission, 12 Utah 2d 265, 365 P. 2d 213,
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the State Land Board sought to purchase private

securities for investment purposes pursuant to
statute; the State Finance Commission contended
such contravened this Article of the Constitution.
This Court held:
"The provision 'in aid of any railroad' etc., was expressly intended to
prevent the use of the finances of the
State to give support to private interests or enterprises, but unless the
element of aiding such enterprise is
present, there is no indication in the
language of the Constitutional provision
itself, nor in the background of its
origin, that the State or its agency
should be prohibited from the purchase
of well established corporate securities
in the interest of prudent handling of
the funds defendant is required to
manage.
The activating purpose makes
the difference.
"When the underlying purpose is
to invest for the benefit of the State
or a political subdivision thereof,
there is no lending of credit or expenditure of funds 'in aid of' such enterprise or undertaking .•..
"'When the underlying and activating purpose of the transaction
and the financial obligation incurred are for the state's benefit,
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there is no lending of its credit
though it may have expended its
funds or incurred an obligation
that benefits another. Merely
because the State incurs an indebtedness or expends its funds for
its benefit and others may incidentally profit thereby, does not bring
the transaction within the letter
or the spirit of the credit clause
prohibition.'"
Here the Board of Commissioners of Salt Lake
City expressly found the Agreement to be for
the general welfare and hence for the benefit
of the City.

The City is to pay the monthly

payments only after each month's services are
rendered.

Assuming the payments to be for a

"corporate purpose", the payments are no more
made "in aid of" private enterprise than would
be payment to a private contractor for painting
the City and County Building.
Cases such as Cinncinati v. Harth {Ohio 1920)
128 N.E.

263, 13 ALR 309 and Anno. at 313, which

held unconstitutional a statute authorizing
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cities to pay for the reconstruction of railroad
tracks, are distinguishable.

In that case, the

uhio constitution provided that a city could not
"raise money for,

or loan its credit to, or

in aid of, any such company".

Here, our Consti-

tution does not prohibit raising money for or
loans to private corporations; it prohibits only
lending credit to or subscribing to the stock or
bonds in aid of private corporations, and this
Agreement is neither a lending of credit nor a
subscription.

Further, there is a distinct

beneficial necessary reason for Salt Lake City
to make this Agreement; the payments are made
to obviate the necessity of City immediately
purchasing the bus line, to minimize the expense

of the City's operating the bus line or hiring
another to do it, and to preserve a going
business for a limited period while the City
determines, with management assistance it has
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purchased under the Agreement, whether to
exercise the purchase option the City purchases
under the Agreement.

This is in distinct con-

trast to the situation in Cincinnati v. Harth
where the payment was made solely to benefit
the railroad and only indirectly to help the
City.

Finally, it is submitted that this Court

should simply decline to follow the reasoning
of Cincinnati v. Harth as its views do not state
the law of Utah.
Plaintiff's Memorandum terms the payment to
Union street as a "subsidy".
inaccurate.

This is clearly

A subsidy is a gift or donation

from the government.

Kennecott Copper Corpora-

tion v. State Tax Commission (D.C. Utah 1944),
60 F.Supp. 181.

Here, the City is receiving

full value and minimizing the expenses it would
otherwise face for the reasons indicated.
POINT III.

THE CITY HAS POWER TO PERFORM

THE AGREEMENT EVEN THOUGH IT ALSO PROVIDES FOR
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SERVICE OUTSIDE SALT LAKE CITY.
Plaintiff claims the City does not have

power to spend its funds for the benefit of
persons other than its own citizens and that it
is so doing because City Lines now operates in
metropolitan Salt Lake and Union Street will
similarly operate.
Section 10-8-14, u.c.A. 1953, at its conclusion, provides:
" ••• (T)hey (the cities) may sell
and deliver the surplus product or service of any such works, not required
by the city or its inhabitants, to others
beyond the limits of the city."
Provo City v. Department of Business Regulation,

118 Utah 1, 218 P. 2d 675 (1950), held:

"The term "street railways' as used
in that section (10-8-14) has been interpreted to mean transit companies
operating within the city limits or
within the municipal area."
In Muir v. Murray City, supra, the contention
Was made that the City was without power to
raise funds to construct an electric transmission
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line to furnish power to a corrununity 7 miles
beyond the municipal boundaries.

This court

held to the contrary, saying:
"In the case at bar the City had
the power to establish an electric light
plant and transmission line, beyond its
boundaries, if necessary, for the purpose of supplying light for itself and
inhabitants.
Comp. Laws Utah 1917, Sec.
570-12 (now 10-8-2, u.c.A. 1953).
" •.• The investment (for which the
money was raised and to which plaintiff
objected) proved to be a profitable
one, and while, as before stated, cities
are not organized primarily as profitmaking concerns, yet when it is incidental,
as in the instant case, to a proper exercise of its legitimate powers, the making
of the enterprise a profitable one was
highly corrunendable." (Emphasis added.)
In City of Mill Valley v. Saxton, supra,

the California Court said:
"The respondent attacks the installation of the system on the grounds that
it would require the taxpayers of the
city to support the transportation system
not only for its own inhabitants but also
of those of the traveling public outside
its boundaries. This it is said might
be a gift of public funds for private
purposes and hence contrary to the
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provisions of ... the Constitution .
... Here we have a case where public
service is exchanged for a compensation
and it will not be assumed that the city
will misuse the power by giving the
transportation free.
On the contrary,
it will be presumed that the city will
exercise the power fairly and in accordance with the purposes of the statutes.
That non-taxpayers living outside the
boundaries of the city may thus obtain
an advantage at the risk of the taxpayers
within the city is no more serious obstacle
to the validity of the scheme than that
non-taxpayers living within the city
limits may enjoy the same advantage.
But if this feature of the general scheme
is objectionable on the grounds stated, it
goes to the entire public utility service
based within and without the municipal
boundaries.
If the plan is economically
sound for this reason, the objections
raised are administrative and legislative,
rather than judicial. Here we have to
consider only that the Constitution and
the statute has conferred the power upon
the city and the wisdom of the legislature
is not a matter for us to decide."
See the Annotation, 98 ALR 1001, in which
, the annotator says:

"Although the later cases tend to
support a more liberal rule, the majority
of thecases collected in a present and
earlier annotations support the view that
a municipal corporation authorized to
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own and opera e a public service utility
has no power, in the absence of statutory
authority, to furnish service beyond
corporate limits."
~e

annotation, based on Muir v. Murray City,

supra, places Utah in the class of cases following the growing minority view that cities may

sell their product outside of corporate limits.
In Wisconsin Power & Light Company v. Public
Service Conunission (Wisc. 1939), 286 N.W. 588,
the city desired to buy a power line which was
an entirely integrated unit and a section of it

was located outside the city limits.

When the

transaction was challenged the court held that
when the legislature allowed the city to take
over a power line, it must have intended the
power to include the whole even though portions
of the whole were outside the city limits.
These cases support the opposition that
Salt Lake City has the power to make the payments
to Union Street even though Union street operates
out of city limits.

Certainly, it has that
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power by statute to the extent of the surplus
service, and whether or not there is surplus
service available is an administrative and
legislative decision to be made by the Board of
corrunissioners of Salt Lake City in the exercise
of its judgment, and such judgment is not subject
to judicial review.
Further, City Lines is required by its
certificate of convenience and necessity to
furnish common carrier service on the lines it
is now operating under.

It cannot simply cease

operating outside of Salt Lake City without the
approval of the public Service Commission.

It

could not sell its operating equipment to Union
Street and still provide service to areas out
of Salt Lake City.

In selling,

it must require

its purchaser to agree to operate all of the
system,

in and out of Salt Lake City, that it

is required to serve.

If the City purchased or

leased the system from City Lirm,

the City would
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be obligated to serve metropolitan Salt Lake
in order to provide service to the City itself.
Ergo, so must Union Street.
Further, any benefit occurring to citizens
out of Salt Lake City is indirect and merely
incidental.
ible benefit

No more direct benefit and indivisis conferred on County residents

than would be conferred when Salt Lake City pays
for air polution control programs in Salt Lake
City which may also keep the air clean out of
Salt Lake City.
Finally,

the fact that the bus line does

operate out of Salt Lake City is a direct benefit
to the residents of Salt Lake City.

City resi-

dents do need transportation to the rretropolitan
area out of the Salt Lake City limits.

The

Board of commissioners of Salt Lake City

expressl~

found,

in entering into the Agreement:
"The loss of such transportation
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system to the residents of Salt Lake
City would amount to a major catastrophe causing great loss to the business
community of the city and great handicap and great inconvenience to the
residents of Salt Lake City in moving
about the City and its environs."
Hence even if a portion of the City's payment
could be segregated into "x" for city transporLation and "y" for county transportation, the
payment for "Y" has still been found by the
Board of Commissioners to be for a corporate
purpose for the citizens of the City.
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that as a
matter of law defendant Salt Lake City Corporation does have power to perform the Agreement
with defendant Union street Railway Corporation,
that plaintiff's Petition for Writ of Prohibition
should be denied and this action should be
dismissed with prejudice.
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DATED this 26th day of July,

1968.
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